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COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2024/2643

of 8 October 2024

concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's destabilising activities

(OJ L 2643, 9.10.2024, p. 1)

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►M2	Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/963 of 20 May 2025	L 963	1	20.5.2025
►M3	Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/966 of 20 May 2025	L 966	1	20.5.2025
►M4	Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/969 of 20 May 2025	L 969	1	21.5.2025
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COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2024/2643

of 8 October 2024

concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's destabilising activities

Article 1

▼M2

1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of natural persons, as listed in Annex I, who are:

(a) responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:

(i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;

(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;

(iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;

(iv) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;

(v) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;

(vi) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;

(vii) exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country;

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(viii) instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country;

(b) associated with the natural persons listed under point (a);

(c) supporting the natural persons engaged in activities referred to in point (a).

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2. Paragraph 1 shall not oblige a Member State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory.

3. Paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to cases in which a Member State is bound by an obligation of international law, namely:

(a) as a host country to an international intergovernmental organisation;

(b) as a host country to an international conference convened by, or under the auspices of the United Nations (UN);

(c) under a multilateral agreement conferring privileges and immunities; or

(d) under the 1929 Treaty of Conciliation (Lateran pact) concluded by the Holy See (State of the Vatican City) and Italy.

4. Paragraph 3 shall also apply where a Member State is host country to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

5. The Council shall be duly informed in all cases where a Member State grants an exemption pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4.

6. Member States may grant exemptions from the measures imposed under paragraph 1 where travel is justified on the grounds of urgent humanitarian need, or on grounds of attending intergovernmental meetings, or those promoted or hosted by the Union or hosted by a Member State holding the Chairmanship in office of the OSCE, where a political dialogue is conducted that directly promotes the policy objectives of those measures.

7. Member States may also grant exemptions from the measures imposed under paragraph 1 where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process, including surrender and extradition procedures.

8. A Member State wishing to grant the exemptions referred to in paragraph 6 or 7 shall notify the Council in writing. An exemption shall be deemed to be granted unless one or more of the Council members raises an objection in writing within 2 working days of receiving notification of the proposed exemption. Should one or more of the Council members raise an objection, the Council, acting by qualified majority, may decide to grant the proposed exemption.

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9. Where, pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 6, 7 or 8, a Member State authorises the entry into, or transit through its territory of a person listed in the Annex, that authorisation shall be limited to the purpose for which it is given to the person concerned therewith.

Article 2

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1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies that are:

(a) responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:

(i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;

(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;

(iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;

(iv) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;

(v) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;

(vi) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;

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(vii) exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country;

(viii) instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country;

(b) associated with the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed under point (a);

(c) supporting the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in point (a), as listed in Annex I, shall be frozen.

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2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex.

3. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources concerned are:

(a) necessary to satisfy the basic needs of the persons listed in the Annex and their dependent family members, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;

(b) intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees and the reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;

(c) intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges for the routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources;

(d) necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the competent authority has notified the competent authorities of the other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least 2 weeks prior to the authorisation;

(e) to be paid into or from an account of a diplomatic mission or consular post or an international organisation enjoying immunities in accordance with international law, insofar as such payments are intended to be used for official purposes of the diplomatic mission or consular post or international organisation;

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(f) necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or partner countries in Russia, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Russia enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or

(g) necessary for the provision of electronic communication services by Union telecommunication operators, and for the provision of associated facilities and services necessary for the operation, maintenance and security of such electronic communication services.

4. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 3 within 2 weeks of that authorisation.

5. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, provided that the following conditions are met:

(a) the funds or economic resources are the subject of an arbitral decision rendered prior to the date on which the person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1 was listed in the Annex, or of a judicial or administrative decision rendered in the Union, or a judicial decision enforceable in the Member State concerned, prior to or after that date;

(b) the funds or economic resources will be used exclusively to satisfy claims secured by such a decision or recognised as valid in such a decision, within the limits set by applicable laws and regulations governing the rights of persons having such claims;

(c) the decision is not for the benefit of a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in the Annex; and

(d) recognition of the decision is not contrary to public policy in the Member State concerned.

6. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisations granted under paragraph 5 within 2 weeks of that authorisation.

7. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent a listed natural or legal person, entity or body from making a payment due under a contract entered into prior to the date on which such natural or legal person, entity or body was listed in the Annex, provided that the Member State concerned has determined that the payment is not, directly or indirectly, received by a natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1.

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8. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:

(a) interest or other earnings on those accounts;

(b) payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the measures provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2; or

(c) payments due under judicial, administrative or arbitral decisions rendered in the Union or enforceable in the Member State concerned;

provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments remain subject to the measures provided for in paragraph 1.

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Article 2a

1. It shall be prohibited to engage, directly or indirectly, in any transaction relating to or involving any tangible asset, such as vessels, aircraft, real estate, ports, airports, and physical elements of digital and communication networks, as listed in Annex II.

2. The list in Annex II shall include tangible assets which are:

(a) used in activities of a destabilising character that endanger or damage critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure, and that are attributable to or benefitting the Government of the Russian Federation;

(b) used in the context of activities of a destabilising character that violate Union, national, or international air, marine or land traffic regulations, and that are attributable to or benefitting the Government of the Russian Federation;

(c) used in activities of a destabilising character, including espionage and surveillance, the transport of weapons or military equipment and personnel, information manipulation and interference, and that are attributable to or benefitting the Government of the Russian Federation;

(d) owned, chartered or operated by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I, or is otherwise used in the name of, on behalf of, in relation with, or for the benefit of, such persons.

3. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions for reasons of maritime or aviation safety, or necessary for humanitarian purposes, or for the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or on the environment, or as a response to natural disasters.

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4. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions resulting from the recognition or enforcement of a judgment or an arbitral award rendered in a Member State, or to transactions carried out for the purposes of an investigation into infringements of this Decision or of an investigation into other illicit activity.

5. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities of a Member State may authorise transactions relating to or involving tangible assets listed in Annex II, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined, on a case by case basis, that the transaction is necessary for any purpose consistent with the objectives of this Decision.

The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any such authorisation granted within two weeks thereof.

Article 2b

1. It shall be prohibited to engage, directly or indirectly, in any transaction with:

(a) a legal person, entity or body established outside the Union that is a credit or financial institution or an entity providing crypto assets services, involved in transactions that facilitate, directly or indirectly, activities referred to in Article 1(1) or Article 2(1) or otherwise supporting persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in Article 1(1) or Article 2(1); or;

(b) a legal person, entity or body providing technical or operational assistance to natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to Article 1(1) or Article 2(1), as listed in Annex III to this Decision.

2. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions that are:

(a) necessary for the export, sale, supply, transfer or transport of pharmaceutical, medical, or agricultural and food products, including wheat and fertilisers;

(b) strictly necessary to ensure access to judicial, administrative or arbitral proceedings in a Member State, as well as for the recognition or enforcement of a judgment or an arbitration award rendered in a Member State, provided that such transactions are consistent with the objectives of this Decision and those of Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 ([1]); or

(c) necessary for humanitarian purposes, such as delivering, or facilitating the delivery of, assistance, including medical supplies, food, or the transfer of humanitarian workers and related assistance, or for evacuations.

([1]) Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's destabilising activities (OJ L, 2024/2642, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2642/oj).

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Article 2c

1. It shall be prohibited for operators to broadcast or to enable, facilitate or otherwise contribute to broadcasting, any content by the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex IV, including through transmission or distribution by any means, such as cable, satellite, IP-TV, internet service providers, internet video-sharing platforms or applications, whether new or pre-installed.

2. Any broadcasting licence or authorisation, transmission or distribution arrangement with the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex IV shall be suspended.

3. It shall be prohibited to advertise products or services in any content produced or broadcast by the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex IV, including through transmission or distribution by any of the means referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

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Article 3

1. Article 2(1) and (2) shall not apply to the provision, processing or payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources or to the provision of goods and services which are necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs where such assistance and other activities are carried out by:

(a) the UN, including its programmes, funds and other entities and bodies, as well as its specialised agencies and related organisations;

(b) international organisations;

(c) humanitarian organisations having observer status with the UN General Assembly and members of those humanitarian organisations;

(d) bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organisations participating in UN Humanitarian Response Plans, UN Refugee Response Plans, other UN appeals or humanitarian clusters coordinated by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs;

(e) organisations and agencies to which the Union has granted the Humanitarian Partnership Certificate or which are certified or recognised by a Member State in accordance with national procedures;

(f) Member States' specialised agencies; or

(g) employees, grantees, subsidiaries, or implementing partners of the entities referred to in points (a) to (f) while and to the extent that they are acting in those capacities.

2. The exemption set out in paragraph 1 shall not apply to the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies identified with an asterisk in the Annex.

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3. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, and by way of derogation from Article 2(1) and (2), the competent authorities of a Member State may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the provision of such funds or economic resources is necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs.

4. In the absence of a negative decision, a request for information or a notification for additional time from the relevant competent authority within 5 working days of the date of receipt of a request for authorisation under paragraph 1, that authorisation shall be considered granted.

5. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under this Article within 4 weeks of such authorisation.

Article 4

1. The Council, acting by unanimity upon a proposal from a Member State or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the 'High Representative'), shall decide to establish and amend the list in the Annex.

2. The Council shall communicate a decision pursuant to paragraph 1, including the grounds for the listing, to the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice in the *Official Journal of the European Union*, providing such natural or legal person, entity or body with an opportunity to present observations.

3. Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review the decision pursuant to paragraph 1 and inform the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned accordingly.

Article 5

1. The Annex shall include the grounds for listing the natural and legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Articles 1 and 2.

2. The Annex shall contain, where available, the information necessary to identify the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies concerned. With regard to natural persons, such information may include: names and aliases; date and place of birth; nationality; passport and identity card numbers; gender; address, if known; and function or profession. With regard to legal persons, entities or bodies, such information may include: names; place and date of registration; registration number; and place of business.

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Article 6

1. The Council and the High Representative may process personal data in order to carry out their tasks under this Decision, in particular:

(a) as regards the Council, for preparing and making amendments to the Annex;

(b) as regards the High Representative, for preparing amendments to the Annex.

2. The Council and the High Representative may process, where applicable, relevant data relating to criminal offences committed by listed natural persons, to criminal convictions of such persons or to security measures concerning such persons, only to the extent that such processing is necessary for the preparation of the Annex.

3. For the purposes of this Decision, the Council and the High Representative are designated as 'controllers' within the meaning of Article 3, point (8), of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council ([1]), in order to ensure that the natural persons concerned can exercise their rights under that Regulation.

Article 7

1. No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Decision, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, in particular a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, in particular a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:

(a) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex;

(b) any natural or legal person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (a).

2. In any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim, the onus of proving that satisfying the claim is not prohibited by paragraph 1 shall be on the natural or legal person, group, entity or body seeking the enforcement of that claim.

([1]) Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39).

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3. This Article is without prejudice to the right of the natural or legal persons, groups, entities and bodies referred to in paragraph 1 to judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations in accordance with this Decision.

Article 8

It shall be prohibited to participate, knowingly or intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions set out in this Decision, including by participating in such activities without deliberately seeking that object or effect but being aware that the participation may have that object or effect and accepting that possibility.

Article 9

In order to maximise the impact of the measures set out in this Decision, the Union shall encourage third States to adopt restrictive measures similar to those provided for in this Decision.

Article 10

This Decision shall apply until 9 October 2025.

This Decision shall be kept under constant review. It shall be renewed or amended, as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met.

The exceptions referred to in Article 3, as regards Article 2(1) and (2), shall be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months or at the urgent request of any Member State, of the High Representative or of the Commission following a fundamental change in circumstances.

Article 11

This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union.*

▼M2

ANNEX I

▼B

List of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Articles 1(1) and 2(1)

▼M1

A. Natural persons

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
1.	Artem Sergeevich KUREEV (Russian: Артём Сергеевич КУРЕЕВ)	Officer of the 5th Service of the Federal Security Service, Editor-in-chief of the 'African Initative', Founder of 'Rusafro' DOB: 24.10.1980 POB: USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport number: 4002209800 Tax Identification Number (INN): 782500167259	Artem Sergeevich Kureev is a Russian Federal Security Service officer involved in malign activities, namely coordinated disinformation campaigns, both in Europe and Africa. He conducts influence campaigns in Europe, including by organising the dissemination of articles in Russian and their English translations on proxy websites and making payments for the publication of pro-Russian articles, with the aim of spreading Russian disinformation in Europe. He founded two media outlets in Africa and conducted deliberate disinformation campaigns aiming at undermining Western health projects in Africa by spreading conspiracy theories such as the alleged use of Africa for biological warfare experiments and illicit trials of various drugs by Western pharmaceutical companies. Therefore, Artem Sergeevich Kureev is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	16.12.2024
2.	Nikolai Aleksandrovich TUPIKIN (Russian: Николай Александрович ТУПИКИН)	Executive director of the Structura National Technologies a.k.a. GK Struktura POB: USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Tax Identification Number (INN): 773402066160	Nikolai Aleksandrovich Tupikin is the head and founder of Structura National Technologies (GK Struktura). The company has been involved in the so-called 'Doppelganger' campaign, a Russian-led digital disinformation campaign aimed at manipulating information and spreading disinformation in support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and targeting the Union's Member States, the United States and Ukraine. He works in close coordination with the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation. He has also been one of the key figures in Russia's disinformation campaign across Latin America aiming at undermining support for Ukraine.	16.12.2024

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Therefore, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Tupikin is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. He is also associated with Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova, department head in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure.	
3.	Sofia Avraamovna ZAKHAROVA (Russian: София Авраамовна ЗАХАРОВА)	Department head in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure POB: USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: female	Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova is the department head in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure. She has been involved in the so-called 'Doppelganger' campaign aimed at manipulating information and spreading disinformation in support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and targeting the Union's Member States, the United States and Ukraine. She has been working directly with Ilya Gambashidze and Nikolai Tupikin, heads of Social Design Agency and GK Struktura, respectively, on this operation. She has also been one of the team leaders and active members of the so-called 'Team I' lead by Ilya Gambashidze, which stands behind the Kremlin's campaign for disinformation in the West, interfering in the elections of different countries, and is preparing projects to discredit the Russian opposition. Therefore, Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	16.12.2024
4.	Andrey Vladimirovich AVERYANOV (Russian: Андрей Владимирович АВЕРЬЯНОВ)	Commander of GRU unit 29155 Major General DOB: 29.9.1967 POB: USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male	Andrey Vladimirovich Averyanov is a high-ranking military official of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). After the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the restructuring of the Wagner Group, the command of Russian military operations in Africa was restructured and placed under the Africa Corps under the umbrella of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and Averyanov was placed in charge of the operations. In many African countries, Russian forces provide security to military juntas that have overthrown legitimate democratic governments, gravely worsening the stability, security and democracy of the countries.	16.12.2024

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
		Tax Identification Number (INN): 773378888007	In addition, Russian forces in Africa exploit the natural resources there to finance their operations. In the beginning of 2024, Russian forces took control of the Intahaka gold mine in Mali. Therefore, Andrey Vladimirovich Averyanov is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in third countries by undermining the democratic political process in the African countries where Russian forces operate and by exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources and wildlife in a third country.	
5.	Tinatin Givievna KANDELAKI a.k.a. Tina KANDELAKI (Russian: Тинатин Гивиевна КАНДЕЛАКИ)	Journalist, public figure, celebrity, TV presenter and producer, Deputy General Director of Gazprom Media Holding DOB: 10.11.1975 POB: Tbilisi, Georgian SSR (now Georgia) Nationality: Georgian Gender: female	Tinatin Givievna Kandelaki is a Russian journalist employed by the state-owned company Gazprom Media, and a public figure who has been using her popularity and influence in the public sphere to voice Russian propaganda and to justify the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. She was among those who performed during the Luzhniki stadium concert of 18 March 2022 that marked the 8th anniversary of the illegal annexation of Crimea and served as a symbol of support for the ongoing war in Ukraine. After 2014, she fully supported the illegal annexation of Crimea. Moreover, she is a Deputy General Director of Gazprom Media Holding, a holding of several media outlets that spread anti-Ukrainian propaganda and justify Russian aggression against Ukraine. Several TV channels owned and governed by Gazprom Media Holding have replaced Ukrainian TV outlets on local TV frequencies previously seized forcefully by Russians after the Russian invasion of Crimea and have thus actively participated in the process of the illegal annexation of Crimea. Therefore, Tinatin Givievna Kandelaki is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation, or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	16.12.2024

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
6.	Vladimir Vladimirovich SERGIYENKO (Russian: Владимир Владимирович СЕРГИЕНКО)	Former assistant of Member of Bundestag Eugen Schmidt DOB: 23.5.1971 POB: Lviv, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine) Nationality: Russian / Ukrainian Gender: male	Vladimir Vladimirovich Sergiyenko is a former parliamentary assistant of the Member of the German Bundestag, Eugen Schmidt. In parallel, Sergiyenko actively colluded with Russian intelligence officers seeking to leverage his privileged parliamentary and political access to the detriment of the democratic political process and constitutional order of the Federal Republic of Germany. Therefore, Vladimir Vladimirovich Sergiyenko implemented and supported actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law and security in the Federal Republic of Germany by engaging in, directly or indirectly, the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process.	16.12.2024
7.	Denis Alexandrovich SMOLYANINOV (Russian: Денис Александрович СМОЛЯНИНОВ)	GRU colonel DOB: 26.8.1976 POB: Chelyabinsk, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport number: 672904784466	Denis Alexandrovich Smolyaninov is a GRU colonel who specialises in psychological operations. He is in charge of the Ukrainian direction of the GRU. Lists of mercenaries to be sent to the Donbass passed through the Ukrainian direction. He also supervised two private military companies (PMCs) associated with the Ministry of Defense: Longifolia, a military company of crime bosses from the 1990s, through which contacts were established with Western PMCs, and Convoy, the military security company. Shortly before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he deployed an agent network in Ukraine. He uses Telegram channels to spread disinformation, including in Ukraine. Through social media he recruits agents for sabotage activities in the Union and other activities aimed at creating tensions between NATO countries. The GRU is responsible for actively preparing explosions, arson and damage to infrastructure on Union territory, with the goal of slowing down the supply of weapons to Ukraine and of creating discord and the appearance of dissatisfaction with support for Ukraine in Europe.	16.12.2024

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Therefore, Denis Alexandrovich Smolyaninov is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing acts of violence, and by facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	
8.	Vladimir/ Volodymyr LIPCHENKO (Russian: Володимир ЛИПЧЕНКО)	GRU officer DOB: 28.9.1974 POB: Mykolaiv, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport number: 4015400649	Vladimir Lipchenko is a GRU officer responsible for hybrid attacks in Europe under his pseudonym 'Wlodek Lyakh'. He is part of a special department led by GRU Colonel Denis Alexandrovich Smolyaninov, set up to conduct sabotage activities in Western countries. He recruited a person to set fire to the Museum of the Occupation in Riga by throwing Molotov cocktails. Therefore, Vladimir Lipchenko is responsible for or implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union by planning and directing acts of violence.	16.12.2024
9.	Yuriy SIZOV (Russian: Юрий СИЗОВ)	GRU military officer DOB: 17.2.1988 POB: St. Petersburg, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport number: 784805190577	Yuriy Sizov is a GRU military officer. He serves in military unit No 92154. He personally gave instructions to recruit agents to target a hypermarket in Kyiv and recorded a video tutorial on installing an explosive device in one of the stores of the same chain in the Moscow region. He was also responsible for orchestrating sabotage in Ukraine in the Lviv region in February 2024. He supervised and gave orders to the Russian intelligence agents involved in the planned sabotage activity. Therefore, Yuriy Sizov is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union by planning and directing acts of violence.	16.12.2024

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
10.	Visa Nokhayevich MIZAEV (Виса Нохаевич МИЗАЕВ) a.k.a. Vishan Nochaevic MIZAYEV; Vysa Nokhaevich MIZAEV; Visa Nokhaievych MIZAIEV; Oleg SHISHKIN	Entrepreneur DOB: 9.7.1963 POB: Grozny, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport No 753870064 (Russian Federation) Passport No PRE0018440 (Federation of Saint Christopher and Nevis) Tax Identification Number (INN): 481101523410	Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev is a Russian entrepreneur. He played a key role in a Russian intelligence operation against the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) in which he instigated his accomplices to procure highly classified information from the BND and to pass it to the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB). Therefore, Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security in the Federal Republic of Germany by attempting to destabilise the constitutional order.	16.12.2024
11.	Olga Alekseevna BELYAVTSEVA (Ольга Алексеевна БЕЛЯВЦЕВА) a.k.a. Olha Oleksiyivna BIELIAVTSEVA; Olga Alekseevna BELJIAWZEWA; Olga Aleksevna MIZAEV	Entrepreneur DOB: 25.10.1969 POB: Lipetsk, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: female Passport No 768613166 (Russian Federation) Tax Identification Number (INN): 481100083621	Olga Alekseevna Belyavtseva is a Russian entrepreneur. She is the wife and business partner of Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev. She is associated with Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev through the co-ownership of the two Russia-based Limited Liability Companies ‘OOO Agronom-sad’ and ‘OOO Biplast’. She founded those companies and was the single shareholder before transferring 30 % of the shares for each company after their marriage in 2018. Moreover, Belyavtseva and Mizaev had a similar ownership arrangement over the company Agronom-Sad Trading before Mizaev sold his shares to Belyavtseva on 22 February 2023 in direct temporal connection with Visa Mizaev’s involvement in the Russian intelligence operation against the Federal Republic of Germany, providing Mizaev with additional liquidity and concealing his asset base. Therefore, Olga Alekseevna Belyavtseva supports natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security of the Federal Republic of Germany. She is also associated with Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev.	16.12.2024

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
12.	Timofey Vyacheslavovich BORDACHEV (Russian: Тимофей Вячеславович БОРДАЧЕВ)	Political scientist DOB: 28.1.1973 POB: St. Petersburg, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male	Timofey Vyacheslavovich Bordachev is a Russian political scientist and international affairs specialist. He is the Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, Academic Supervisor of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics, as well as member of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy. Through his activities, he substantially contributes to the ideological base and rationalisation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and aggressive policies of the Kremlin, including by promoting the view that neither Ukraine as a state nor its government are legitimate. Therefore, Timofey Vyacheslavovich Bordachev is responsible for or supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of Ukraine by engaging in and supporting the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	16.12.2024
13.	Harouna DOUAMBA	Businessman, director of the Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l'investissement DOB: 8.1.1973 POB: Cocody, Ivory Coast Nationality: Ivorian Gender: male	Harouna Douamba is an Ivorian businessman, and the head of a pro-Russian, anti-Western disinformation network in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Burkina Faso. In 2011, Douamba founded a non-governmental organisation called *Aimons Notre Afrique* (ANACOM) in the CAR. That organisation received funding from Lobaye Invest, which has been associated with the Wagner Group. In 2022, Harouna Douamba established the *Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l'Investissement* (GPCI) in Burkina Faso. GPCI has been involved in covert influence operations. Harouna Douamba's disinformation networks were dismantled by Meta in May 2021, and later in May 2023. Despite this, GPCI-related disinformation groups are still active and running structured and coordinated disinformation campaigns, with the use of a vast network of information chains. Those campaigns target France in particular, including through accusations of conspiracy, terrorism, destabilisation operations or preparing coups against the Union or its Member States.	16.12.2024

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Therefore, Harouna Douamba is supporting and implementing actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State or in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	

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14.	Anatolii PRIZENKO	Businessman DOB: 26.11.1974 POB: Moldovan SSR (now Republic of Moldova) Nationality: Moldovan Gender: male	Anatolii Prizenko is a businessman in the Republic of Moldova. In late October 2023, he coordinated the dispatch of several citizens of the Republic of Moldova to France, where they painted the Star of David on the streets in exchange for financial compensation. That operation was widely reported by the media and had a significant destabilising effect in the context of the conflict between Israel and Hamas following the attacks on 7 October 2023. Images of that operation were first spread by the Recent Reliable News media network, which is associated with the Government of the Russian Federation and used by Russian actors to conduct disinformation campaigns. Anatolii Prizenko publicly took responsibility for his role as the organiser of that operation. According to media reports, that destabilising operation was carried out for the benefit of the Russian military intelligence service, the GRU, and aimed at fuelling tensions in French society. Therefore, Anatolii Prizenko is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability in a Member State and, therefore, in the Union by planning, directing, or engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	16.12.2024

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15.	Alesia MILORADOVICH or Alesya MILORADOVICH or Olesya MILORADOVIC Алеся МИЛОРАДОВИЧ or Олеся МИЛОРАДОВИЧ	Russian Government employee, ‘Foreign Affairs Facilitator’ Associate of the project ‘Foreign journalists for Russia’ (‘Иностранные журналисты за Россию’) DOB: 10.3.1968 POB: Angarsk, USSR (now Russian Federation)	Alesya Miloradovich is a collaborator of the Government of the Russian Federation in France, and calls herself a ‘foreign affairs facilitator’. Alesya Miloradovich organised a so-called ‘electoral observation’ mission in the Ukrainian territories illegally occupied by Russia, in the context of the referendum on the annexation of those regions to Russia, and recruited French nationals who participated in the mission. She publicly admitted that she did this for the benefit of the Russian Government.	16.12.2024

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
		Nationality: Russian Gender: female	She was also a co-organiser of trips for French children to the Artek International Children Center in illegally annexed Crimea, which were funded by the Government of the Russian Federation. She has also been involved in the Russian propaganda project 'Foreign journalists for Russia' and has participated in spreading pro-Russian views, including by claiming that French and Western societies support Russian actions against Ukraine. Therefore, Alesya Miloradovich is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process of a third country, including by attempting to destabilise its constitutional order.	
16.	Oleg Sergeevich EREMENKO (Russian: Олег Сергеевич ЕРЕМЕНКО)	Representative of Officers of Russia, former GRU officer DOB: 18.5.1978 POB: Bischkek, Kyrgyz SSR (now Kyrgyzstan) Nationality: Russian Gender: Male	Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is a former GRU officer and an active member of various Russian influence groups. Notably, he is a member of 'Officers of Russia' an organisation used by the Russian military and security services to influence domestic politics by cultivating links to veterans amongst the Russian diaspora and to retired military and security personnel of former Soviet-allied armed forces, in which he serves as their main representative in Germany. In that capacity, Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is associated with the EU designated entities Rossotrudnitschestvo, which is the operator of the 'Russian House' in Berlin, and the Wagner Group. In his role as an envoy of the Russian state security apparatus, Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is cultivating links to and supporting anti-democratic organisations within Germany. He is well connected with far-left anti-democratic groups and groups of former personnel of outlawed GDR security services and veterans of GDR military formations, such as Desant e.V., a pro-Russian association of former paratroopers. Therefore, Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Federal Republic of Germany by undermining the democratic political process, including by attempting to destabilise its constitutional order.	16.12.2024

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
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17.	Alik Yuryevich KHUCHBAROV Alik Yuryevich HUCHBAROV Alik HUTŠBAROV (Russian: Алик Юрьевич ХУЧБАРОВ)	Function: GRU operative DOB: 12.11.1992 Nationality: Russian, Estonian Gender: male Tax identification number: 601515903509	Alik Khuchbarov was reponsible for planning and preparing an operation in Estonia, which entailed damaging the property of public figures who have spoken out against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as defacing monuments related to World War II. In doing so, he acted under the direction, in the interests and at the request of Russia's military foreign intelligence agency (GRU) to hire perpetrators to carry out the attacks. In the attacks, vehicles of the Estonian Minister of the Interior as well as of the editor-in-chief of a Russian-language newspaper were targetted. The security services of Estonia prevented further attacks targeting more public figures. In addition, several war memorials in Estonia were defaced, with paint thrown on them and swastikas drawn on them. The aim of the operation was to create fear, panic and tension in Estonian society, and to intimidate persons critical of Russian actions and policies.As a collaborator in the GRU's network, Alik Khuchbarov is responsible for implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State through planning and directing acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation.	20.5.2025
18.	Ilya Sergeevich BOCHAROV Ilja BOTŠAROV (Russian: Илья Сергеевич БОЧАРОВ)	Function: GRU operative DOB: 29.6.1991 Nationality: Russian Gender: male Tax identification number: 561410364291	Ilya Bocharov was reponsible for planning and preparing an operation in Estonia, which entailed damaging the property of public figures who have spoken out against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as defacing monuments related to World War II. In doing so, he acted under the direction, in the interests and at the request of Russia's military foreign intelligence agency (GRU) to hire perpetrators to carry out the attacks. In the attacks, vehicles of the Estonian Minister of the Interior as well as of the editor-in-chief of a Russian-language newspaper were targetted. The security services of Estonia prevented further attacks targeting more public figures. In addition, several war memorials in Estonia were defaced, with paint thrown on them and swastikas drawn on them. The aim of the operation was to create fear, panic and tension in Estonian society, and to intimidate persons critical of Russian actions and policies.As a collaborator in the GRU's network, Ilya Bocharov is responsible for implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State through planning and directing acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation.	20.5.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
19.	Elena KOLBASNIKOVA (Russian: Елена КОЛБАСНИКОВА)	Nationality: Ukrainian, Russian DOB: 20.3.1975 POB: Dnipro, Ukraine SSR (now Ukraine) Gender: female	Elena Kolbasnikova is a Russian national who has close ties with, and is financially supported by, Rossotrudnitschestwo, a Russian state entity. Kolbasnikova formed political structures with the German anti-democratic extreme political right in support of Russia's destabilisation of Ukraine. She was sentenced for hate speech in a court of final instance in Germany in regard to her undermining of Ukrainian sovereignty and denouncement of German public institutions. Criminal investigations are ongoing in regard to her support of separatists in the Donbas with military hardware, through fundraisers and the provision of aid to separatist groups. Moreover, Kolbasnikova promoted violent acts committed by her husband, Rostislav Teslyuk, against counter-demonstrators, and organised car rallies to intimidate Ukrainian minors seeking refuge in Germany. She thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of a Member State through activities aimed at undermining the democratic political process in Germany. She also supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the security of a third country (Ukraine), through instigating or facilitating an armed conflict, by supporting separatist movements in Ukraine. Elena Kolbasnikova is associated with Rostislav Teslyuk, through joint efforts in destabilising activities.	20.5.2025
20.	Hüseyin DOGRU	Address: Kavacık Mahallesi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Caddesi, Tonoglu Block No.: 3, Beykoz, Istanbul, Türkiye Nationality: Turkish Gender: male	Hüseyin Doğru is the founder and representative of AFA Medya A.Ş. which is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ş. operates "RED", which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and shares deep structural ties, including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations.	20.5.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas. During a violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, RED personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate images of their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through their online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform, facilitating the violent nature of the protest. Through AFA Medya, Hüseyin Doğru thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in coordinated information manipulation.	
21.	Yulia Sergeevna PROKHOROVA (Russian: Юлия Сергеевна ПРОХОРОВА)	Nationality: Russian DOB: 18.2.1992 Address: Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates. Formerly Landshut, Bavaria, Germany Gender: female	Yulia Prokhorova is a Russian citizen. She resided in Germany until 2024. Yulia Prokhorova sustains a social media campaign in which she promoted the intentional wasting of energy in Germany, seeking to support Russia’s war of aggression. In parallel, she disseminates misinformation in Russian state media about the energy supply, the rule of law, and Ukrainian refugees in Germany. In addition, Yulia Prokhorova intimidated Ukrainian refugees in Europe through public assaults and other forms of harassment, which she recorded and disseminated online. Yulia Prokhorova thus supports actions and policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one Member State by engaging in the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference and indirectly supporting actions targeted at economic activities and services of public interest.	20.5.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
22.	Rostislav TESLYUK (Russian: Ростислав ТЕСЛЮК) Alias Max SCHLUND (Russian: Макс ШЛУНД)	Nationality: Russian DOB: 23.4.1982 POB: Moscow Gender: male	Rostislav Teslyuk is a Russian national who has close ties with, and is financially supported by, Rossotrudnitschestwo, a Russian state entity. Rostislav Teslyuk formed political structures with the German anti-democratic extreme political right in support of Russia's destabilisation of Ukraine. Criminal investigations in regard to his support of separatists in the Donbas with military hardware are ongoing. Rostislav Teslyuk committed violent acts against counter-demonstrators and organised car rallies to intimidate Ukrainian minors seeking refuge in Germany, together with Elena Kolbasnikova. He thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of a Member State (Germany) through activities aimed at undermining the democratic political process in Germany. He is also responsible for actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine the security of a third country (Ukraine) through instigating or facilitating an armed conflict, by his support for separatist movements in Ukraine. Rostislav Teslyuk is associated with Elena Kolbasnikova, who is subject to restrictive measures, through joint efforts in destabilising activities.	20.5.2025
23.	Alina LIPP	Function: war correspondent DOB: 17.9.1993 POB: Hamburg Nationality: German Gender: female	Alina Lipp runs the blog "Neues aus Russland", in which she systematically disseminates misinformation about Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, and delegitimises the Ukrainian government, especially with a view to manipulating German public sentiment as regards support for Ukraine. Furthermore, she is using her role as a war correspondent with the Russian armed forces in eastern Ukraine to spread Russian war propaganda. She regularly appears in troop entertainment and propaganda shows on the Russian military TV channel Zvezda. Thus, Alina Lipp is engaging in and supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten security and stability in the Union and in a third country (Ukraine) through the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference, and through facilitating an armed conflict in a third country.	20.5.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
24.	Viktor Volodymyrovych MEDVEDCHUK (Ukrainian: Віктор Володимирович МЕДВЕДЧУК) (Russian: Виктор Владимирович МЕДВЕДЧУК)	Function: Politician, businessman, de facto media owner DOB: 7.8.1954 POB: Pochet, Krasnoyarskyi Krai, Russian SFSR, USSR Nationality: Russian Gender: male Address: Moscow Ukrainian Tax ID (Код ДРФО): 1994214296 (void)	Viktor Medvedchuk is a former Ukrainian politician and businessman, who has been the leading proponent of a pro-Russian policy in Ukraine and who has promoted policies and actions intended to erode the credibility and legitimacy of the Government of Ukraine. Viktor Medvedchuk has close personal ties to, and is associated with, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin. Through his associates, including Artem Marchevskyi, Viktor Medvedchuk controlled Ukrainian media outlets and used them to disseminate pro-Russian propaganda in Ukraine and beyond. After the start of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, Viktor Medvedchuk spread Russian propaganda narratives about the war, undermining Ukrainian sovereignty. To that end, in April 2023, Viktor Medvedchuk founded a political movement in Russia called "Another Ukraine". With his associates and associated entities, including Artem Marchevskyi and the Voice of Europe media channel, and in close coordination with the Russian authorities, Viktor Medvedchuk has continued funding and carrying out influence operations targeting political parties and individual politicians in Europe. Those activities aimed to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and to spread its influence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections. Those activities included providing financial resources to individual political actors in Europe, including selected candidates in the European Parliament elections, and for cooperation with journalists. Viktor Medvedchuk has directed and maintained control over the malign activities of Artem Marchevskyi and Voice of Europe, using Artem Marchevskyi's de facto direction of Voice of Europe. Therefore, Viktor Medvedchuk is responsible for, implementing, supporting, or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in a third country, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through planning, directing, engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including the 2024 European Parliament elections, and through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference.	20.5.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
25.	Artem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKYI Artem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKIJ Artem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKIY Artěm Pavlovič MARČEVSKIJ (Ukrainian: Артем Павлович МАРЧЕВСЬКИЙ) (Russian: Артем Павлович МАРЧЕВСКИЙ)	Function: Politician, media producer, propagandist DOB: 5.7.1988 POB: Kyiv, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, (now Ukraine) Nationality: Ukrainian, Israeli Gender: male Address: Hovorčovická 1079, 250 65 Líbeznice, Czech Republic Ukrainian Tax ID (Код ДРФО): 3232824038	Artem Marchevskyi is a former Ukrainian politician closely associated with Viktor Medvedchuk, a former Ukrainian politician and businessperson with close connections to the Government of the Russian Federation. By virtue of his position in the pro-Russian party “Opposition Platform – For Life” and in a TV channel involved in pro-Russian propaganda, Artem Marchevskyi supported and provided assistance to Viktor Medvedchuk in the years 2018 to 2021. Artem Marchevskyi and Viktor Medvedchuk continued to coordinate after they both left Ukraine following the Russian invasion in 2022, with Viktor Medvedchuk directing and controlling Artem Marchevskyi’s activities facilitating construction of Medvedchuk’s influence network in the Union and its Member States. Artem Marchevskyi has played an instrumental role in disseminating concerted disinformation and biased narratives aimed at supporting the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and spreading its influence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections, by undermining the credibility and public image of Ukraine and its efforts to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression. Artem Marchevskyi played a key role in the acquisition of the media brand “Voice of Europe” and the incorporation of its activity in a company of the same name. As the concealed head of Voice of Europe, Artem Marchevskyi has used the company to funnel financial resources designated for the remuneration of propagandists, and to build an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe. Therefore, Artem Marchevskyi is responsible for actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process and through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference.	20.5.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
26.	Natallia SUDLIANKOVA A.k.a.: Natallia SUDLENKOVA Natalia SUDLENKOVA Natalia SUDLIANKOVÁ (ŠEVKOVÁ) Natalija SUDLIANKOVÁ (ŠEVKOVÁ) (Russian: Наталья СУДЛЕНКОВА (ШЕВКО)) Alias: Natalyia KORNELYUK (Russian: Наталья КОРНЕЛЮК)	Function: Journalist, Media and PR Consultant, Coordinator DOB: 9.6.1964 POB: Belarus Nationality: Belarusian Gender: female Address: Borovanského 2381/22, 155 00 Prague, Czech Republic Identity documents: Travel document: U0002974, valid until 18.3.2031 Residence Permit: 001631077, valid until 13.3.2034	Natallia Sudliankova is a journalist and a media and PR consultant who has been producing custom-made media products that included information manipulation and spreading misleading narratives aiming to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and aiming to undermine the public trust towards Czech national and European Union democratic values and processes. Sudliankova has been receiving assignments over a long period of time and has been financially rewarded. She plays a significant role in planning and directing coordinated information manipulation intended for the public in the Czech Republic and in other Member States, and cooperates with Russian state entities (Rosatom, Pravfond), entities representing the interests of the Russian Federation (Immortal Regiment of Russia), and Alexey Nikolayevich Shavrov, an officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). Therefore, Natallia Sudliankova is responsible for actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation.	20.5.2025
27.	Iurie NECULITI (Russian: Юрие НЕКУЛИТИ)	Function: CEO of Stark Industries Nationality: of the Republic of Moldova Gender: male Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of Moldova POB: Bender, Republic of Moldova	Iurie Neculiti is CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world. Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.	20.5.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Therefore, as CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest. Iurie Neculiti is associated with Ivan Neculiti and Stark Industries.	
28.	Ivan NECULITI (Russian: Иван НЕКУЛИТИ)	Function: Owner of Stark Industries and PQ Hosting Nationality: of the Republic of Moldova Gender: male Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of Moldova POB: Bender, Republic of Moldova	Ivan Neculiti is the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world. Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies. Ivan Neculiti is associated with Iurie Neculiti and Stark Industries. Therefore, as the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. Ivan Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and in a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.	20.5.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
29.	Andrei KHARKOVSKY (Russian: Андрей ХАРКОВСКИЙ)	Function: Leading member of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad Nationality: Russian POB: Tomsk Region, Russia Gender: male Address: Germany	Andrei Kharkovsky is a Russian citizen living in Germany. In Germany, Kharkovsky functions as a representative of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad, including by organising military-style gatherings for its members. The Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad is an entity linked to the Government of the Russian Federation, and partaking in Russia's war of aggression and acts of violence in Ukraine in support of pro-Russian separatists under the premise of a "historical mission" to reinstate Russian control over southern and eastern Ukraine. As a member of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad, Kharkovsky is engaging in acts of violence. Andrei Kharkovsky is therefore supporting actions of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the sovereignty and security of Ukraine by attempting to overthrow the constitutional order of Ukraine.	20.5.2025
30.	Anatoli Yurevich ABRAMOV (Russian: Анатолий Юрьевич АБРАМОВ)	Function: Director of the General Radio Frequency Centre branch in the Northwestern Federal District Nationality: Russian Gender: male	Anatoly Abramov is the director of the General Radio Frequency Centre's Northwestern Federal District branch. Branch heads are appointed and dismissed by the Director of the GRFC in agreement with Roskomnadzor, and act on behalf of the GRFC. He oversees the use of radio frequencies and devices in the Kaliningrad region. Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.	20.5.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Therefore, Anatoly Abramov is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States, through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure.	
31.	Ruslan Vasilyevich NESTERENKO (Russian: Руслан Васильевич НЕСТЕРЕНКО)	Function: Acting General Director of the GRFC Nationality: Russian Gender: male	Ruslan Nesterenko is the acting general director of the General Radio Frequency Centre (GRFC). He oversees the use of radio frequencies and ensures compliance with legislation. Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, Russia, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States and disrupting civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC. Under Nesterenko's direction, the GRFC is involved in planning and supporting information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States. As per the GRFC Charter, the general director represents the enterprise's interests within Russia and beyond its borders. Therefore, Ruslan Nesterenko is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure and through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.	20.5.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
32.	Viktor Aleksandrovitch LUKOVENKO (Russian: Виктор Александрович ЛУКОВЕНКО) Alias Viktor VASILEV (Russian: Виктор ВАСИЛЬЕВ)	Function: Head of the news agency “African Initiative” DOB: 6.4.1985 Nationality: Uzbek Gender: male	Viktor Lukovenko has been active on the African continent for several years, previously as a member of the Wagner Group and now as the head of the news agency “African Initiative”. He is involved in spreading Russian propaganda on the continent. He is linked to well known figures of Russian propaganda in Africa. Additionally, Viktor Lukovenko was sent to Ukraine in 2022 before the war, under the supervision of a GRU colonel, in order to recruit pro-Russian sympathisers. Viktor Lukovenko is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly and indirectly, supporting and facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.	20.5.2025
33.	Oleg Anatoliyovych VOLOSHIN (Ukrainian: Олег Анатолійович ВОЛОШИН) (Russian: Олег Анатольевич ВОЛОШИН)	Nationality: Russian DOB: 7.4.1981 POB: Nikolaev, USSR (now Ukraine) Passport No.: ET870130 ID-No.: 1981040705733; 2968200719 Gender: male	Oleg Voloshin is a former Ukrainian member of parliament and a member of the pro-Russian political party “Opposition Platform – For Life” (OPFL). He is part of the network behind “Voice of Europe” and is active at Golos.eu and PolitWera, both platforms spreading disinformation and pro-Russian narratives. He was involved in bribe payments made to Western politicians. Oleg Voloshin has used his position as Ukrainian delegate to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2019-2023) to implement the strategy of Russian interference in Europe led by pro-Russian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, who leads OPFL.	20.5.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			In particular, Voloshin has promoted Medvedchuk's "peace plan" for Ukraine, which is linked to the Russian narrative regarding Russia's war of aggression. In order to win-over European elected representatives to his cause, he has organised conferences with French and German parliamentarians, arguing that the "Normandy format" (France, Germany, Ukraine, Russia) has a so-called parliamentary dimension outside any official framework. The most recent event was organised by Voloshin at the French Senate on 11 February 2022 ("Peace process in Ukraine: how to break the deadlock"), a few days before the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army. Thus, Oleg Voloshin is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union and its Member States, including Germany, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly and indirectly, the obstruction and undermining of the democratic political process.	
34.	Justin Blaise TAGOUH (Russian: Жюстин Блез ТАГУ)	Function: CEO of press group International Afrique Media (IAM), which includes the TV channel Afrique Média, IAM press review, and Courrier Confidentiel DOB: 1959 Gender: male	Justin Tagouh is CEO of the press group International Africa Media. This media group has direct links with the Russian authorities, and spreads Russian narrative and anti-western narrative in African countries. Justin Tagouh is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	20.5.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
35.	Mikhaïl Mikhaïlovich PRUDNIKOV Alias “Micha” (Russian: Михаил Михайлович ПРУДНИКОВ)	Function: Member of Africa Politology, entity responsible for disinformation and Russian propaganda in the Central African Republic POB: Tambov Oblast Nationality: Russian Gender: male	Mikhaïl Prudnikov is a Russian disinformation activist operating in the Central African Republic (CAR) who has close links with the Wagner galaxy and disinformation campaign holdings in CAR through various newspapers and networks. In particular, he developed a narrative against western countries and participated in communication actions in order to undermine and threaten the Union’s image in the CAR. Mikhaïl Prudnikov is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.	20.5.2025
36.	Sylvain AFOUA (Russian: Сильвен АФУА) Alias Egountchi BEHANZIN (Russian: Эгунчи БЕХАНЗИН)	Function: Founder of the pan-African group “Ligue de défense noire Africaine” (LDNA); influencer/activist known by the pseudonym “Egountchi Behanzin” DOB: 5.11.1988 POB: Madjikpeto, Togo Nationality: French, Togolese Gender: male Website: www.egountchibehanzin.com	Sylvain Afoua is a pro-Russian activist, founder of the “*Ligue de défense noire Africaine*” (LDNA) (Black African Defence League), a group involved in hit actions on French territory. The structure was dissolved by a French ministerial decree of 29 September 2021 for spreading an ideology calling for hatred, discrimination and violence. Sylvain Afoua spreads Russian narratives and misinformation on the war of aggression against Ukraine, which he carries out in particular on the African continent. His message is transmitted via social networks and his association’s website. He is regularly invited to Russian fora and is, furthermore, financially linked to the Wagner Group. Sylvain Afoua is therefore responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.	20.5.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
37.	Thomas RÖPER (Russian: Томас РЁПЕР)	Function: war correspondent DOB: 26.11.1971 POB: Bremen Nationality: German Gender: male	Thomas Röper is a German blogger. Through his network of online channels named "Anti-Spiegel", he systematically disseminates misinformation about Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and delegitimises the Ukrainian government, especially with a view to manipulating German public sentiment regarding support to Ukraine. Furthermore, he legitimises Russia's illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory by serving as an election "observer" and participating in a campaign to promote Russia's illegal referendum on the secession from Ukraine of the Russian-occupied territories. Moreover, he has served as a spokesperson for the Government of the Russian Federationto disseminate Russian propaganda narratives, including at the UN Arria-forum. Thomas Röper is therefore engaging in and supporting the use of information manipulation and interference and facilitates an armed conflict in a third country.	20.5.2025

▼M5

38.	Nathalie YAMB	DOB: 22.7.1969 POB: La Chaux-de-Fonds, Switzerland Nationality: Swiss and Cameroonian Gender: female	Nathalie Yamb is a social media influencer. Since the Sochi summit she attended in 2019, Nathalie Yamb has been an outspoken supporter of Russia, adopting Moscow's language and targeting France and the West in particular, with a view to ousting them from the African continent. She has specific ties with AFRIC, an organisation linked to Russian private military companies. Therefore, Nathalie Yamb is supporting actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in its Member States by engaging in the use of information manipulation.	26.6.2025

▼M6

39.	Andrey Yuryevich ROMANCHENKO (Russian: Андрей Юрьевич РОМАНЧЕНКО)	Function: General Director of the Federal State-owned Enterprise 'Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network' (RTRS) DOB: 16.10.1960 POB: Moscow, Russian SSR (now Russian Federation)	Andrey Yuryevich Romanchenko is the General Director of The Federal State-owned Enterprise 'Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network' (RTRS), a Russian federal unitary for-profit enterprise of strategic significance, operating terrestrial radio and television broadcasting infrastructure in Russia. Romanchenko, who was appointed as General Director by the Russian President, directs the RTRS, which plays a direct role in implementing policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation by providing the infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called 'All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels' such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24 which disseminate Russian state propaganda.	15.7.2025

▼M6

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
		Nationality: Russian Gender: male Russian Tax ID (ИНН): 771515786260	Under Romanchenko's leadership, RTRS has played a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine's governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied territories is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the exclusive right to establish transmission infrastructure in the occupied territories. By overseeing and directing these operations, Romanchenko actively facilitates the obstruction of access to diverse and independent information, thereby assuming responsibility for the use of information manipulation. Therefore, Romanchenko, as the head of RTRS, benefits from and implements policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.	
40.	Vladimir NAIDENOV (Russian: Владимир НАЙДЕНОВ)	Function: Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories of the Federal State-owned Enterprise 'Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network' (RTRS) Gender: male Nationality: Russian	Vladimir Naidenov is the Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories at the Federal State-owned Enterprise 'Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network' (RTRS), a Russian federal unitary for-profit enterprise of strategic significance operating terrestrial radio and television broadcasting infrastructure in Russia. Vladimir Naidenov, is subordinated to the RTRS General Director Andrey Yuryevich Romanchenko, who directs the RTRS and plays a direct role in implementing policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation. RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called 'All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels' such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24 which disseminate Russian state propaganda.	15.7.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			In his position within the RTRS, Vladimir Naidenov has played a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine's governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there. Therefore, Vladimir Naidenov, as the Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories at RTRS, facilitates the obstruction of access to diverse and independent information by coordinating the RTRS infrastructure development in the occupied Ukrainian territories and thus implements policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference	
41.	Dmitri BUIMISTRU	Function: TV presenter, actor; blogger DOB: 26.11.1992 POB: Chișinău, Republic of Moldova Nationality: Moldovan Gender: male	Dmitri Buimistru intentionally engages in coordinated information manipulation and interference by operating as a key propagandist on MD24, a Russia-based online TV channel created by Ilan Shor following license withdrawals from his previous stations for disseminating Russian disinformation. To that end, Buimistru deliberately spreads demonstrably false claims – systematically debunked by independent fact-checkers – regarding NATO drawing Moldova into conflict, imminent revocation of constitutional neutrality, 'Romanization' of institutions, misrepresentation of the EU referendum's constitutional implications, and fabricated trade statistics.	15.7.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Furthermore, his participation in synchronised cross-platform disinformation campaigns is evidenced by the July 2023 Russian embassy surveillance equipment scandal, where his messaging was perfectly coordinated with other pro-Kremlin outlets, demonstrating centralised orchestration. In addition, Buimistru's 'SOSEDI' project has been identified as a key tool in a broader external influence operation. His systematic promotion of other pro-Russian information sources and deployment of consistent messaging tactics specifically designed to undermine Moldova's sovereignty, European integration, and democratic processes further confirms his deliberate engagement in coordinated information manipulation with a view to serving Russian destabilisation interests in Moldova. Therefore, Dmitri Buimistru is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability in a third country through engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	
42.	Veaceslav VALICO	Function: Activist DOB: 10.8.1977 POB: Chișinău, Republic of Moldova Nationality: Moldovan Gender: male	Veaceslav Valico participated, alongside Anatolii Prizenko, a natural person listed by the Union, in the Russian destabilisation operation concerning the painting of the Star of David on the streets of Paris following the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel in exchange for financial compensation and in order to create tensions in French society. Moreover, Veaceslav Valico is involved in the systematic dissemination of disinformation in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, as part of the Russian Federation's malign hybrid activities. Furthermore, Veaceslav Valico is associated with Anatolii Prizenko, who is an individual listed by the Union. Their association predates their collaboration in the Paris incident. Therefore, Veaceslav Valico is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the stability in a Member State and therefore, in the Union, and in third countries, through planning, directing, and engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	15.7.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
43.	Simeon BOIKOV	Function: Pro-Russian blogger Date of birth: 15.2.1990 Place of birth: Sydney, Australia Gender: male Nationality: Australian/Russian	Simeon Boikov is an Australian pro-Russian activist known by the pseudonym 'Aussie Cossack'. He is recognised for disseminating pro-Kremlin narratives and misinformation, particularly regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Boikov has also been implicated in spreading disinformation related to the 2024 U.S. presidential election, notably by paying an American influencer to post a Storm-1516 fabricated video falsely depicting voter fraud in Georgia. Therefore, Simeon Boikov is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	15.7.2025
44.	Vitaly KULIKOV (Russian: Виталий КУЛИКОВ)	Function: Lieutenant Colonel in the Russian military, heading the Electronic Warfare (EW) center of the Baltic Fleet Nationality: Russian Gender: male	Lieutenant Colonel Vitaly Kulikov is the commander of the Electronic Warfare (EW) center of the Baltic Fleet also known as the 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center. Vitaly Kulikov oversees exercises of his EW troops in the Kaliningrad region. GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and 'spoofing' of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The EW center of the Baltic Fleet, under Kulikov's commands, has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas, and is also involved in planning, supporting and executing coordinated information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States. Therefore, Vitaly Kulikov is responsible for planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.	15.7.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
45.	Yuri Illarionovich LASTOCHKIN (Russian: Юрий Илларионович ЛАСТОЧКИН Ukrainian: Юрій Ілларіонович ЛАСТОЧКІН)	Function: Official of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; Military Leader; General-Major/Lieutenant General; Chief of the Electronic Warfare Forces of the Russian Federation/head of Russian Defense Ministry's Radio-Electronic Warfare (REB) force DOB: 18.8.1967 POB: Rzhavka, Mogilev region, Belarusian SSR (now Belarus) Nationality: Russian Gender: male	Lieutenant General Yuri Lastochkin is the chief of the Electronic Warfare (EW) Forces of the Russian Federation. Yuri Lastochkin oversees actions and exercises of Russia's EW troops, including those of the 841st Separate EW center in the Kaliningrad region. Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and 'spoofing' of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The 841st Separate EW center in the Kaliningrad region, under Lastochkin's commands, has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas; it is also involved in planning, supporting and executing coordinated information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States. Therefore, Y. I. Lastochkin is responsible for planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.	15.7.2025
46.	Yevgeny Shevchenko (Russian: Евгений ШЕВЧЕНКО)	Function: Founder of TigerWeb Nationality: Russian Gender: male Tax identification number: 910202780107	Yevgeny Shevchenko is a web developer who has specialised in creating websites for many years. He is the founder of Tigerweb, the web-company that runs the informational manipulation set 'Portal Kombat' which disseminates pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, on several so-called 'informational portals'. Therefore, he is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	15.7.2025

▼M6

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
47	Aleksey Nikolayevich SHAVROV (Russian: Алексей Николаевич ШАВРОВ) a.k.a. Andrey PETROV (Russian: Андрей ПЕТРОВ)	Function: Military Intelligence Officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) DOB: 12.12.1989 Nationality: Russian Gender: male	Aleksey Shavrov is a GRU officer involved in Russian influence operations directed to destabilise the Union and its Member States. Aleksey Shavrov´s malign activities include information manipulation and disinformation campaigns in the Czech Republic and other Union Member States. Through his concealed associate, Natallia Sudliankova, Aleksey Shavrov conducts influence campaigns, including by organising the dissemination of tailor-made articles in various European media outlets. Misleading or outright false narratives aim to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and to spread its influence. Moreover, the content is designed to further undermine public trust in the Union values and processes, democracy and Union cohesion. Articles also contain specific manipulative anti-NATO, anti-Ukraine and anti-NGO narratives. Aleksey Shavrov instructed Natallia Sudliankova to spread and disseminate those divisive messages through media to amplify their polarising content. Aleksey Shavrov provided financial rewards for accomplishing tasks and for publication of those custom-made pro-Russian media campaigns. Therefore, Aleksey Shavrov is implementing actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	15.7.2025

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B. Legal persons, entities and bodies

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
1.	GRU Unit 29155 ФКУ ‘Войсковая Часть 29155’	Place of registration: 105077, Moscow 11th Parkovaya Street, 38A Registration No: 7719737879 OGRN: 1097746770395	GRU Unit 29155 is a covert unit within the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU), known for its involvement in foreign assassinations and destabilisation activities across Europe. Through coups, assassinations, bombings, and cyberattacks against other countries around the world in connection with the war in Ukraine, it has sought to create chaos and destabilise European Union countries. By carrying out such actions, it seeks to help and benefit Russia. GRU Unit 29155 carried out cyberattacks and other attacks against critical infrastructure. Therefore, it is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating acts of violence, as well as planning, directing, engaging in, supporting or otherwise facilitating any actions aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure.	16.12.2024
2.	Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l’Investissement GPCI	Place of registration: Lomé, Togo Date of registration: January 2022	*Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l’Investissement* (GPCI) is a disinformation network carrying out pro-Russian covert influence operations, particularly in the Central African Republic and Burkina Faso. GPCI was dismantled by Meta in May 2023. Despite this, GPCI is still active and is running structured and coordinated disinformation campaigns with the use of a vast network of information chains. Those campaigns target France in particular, including through accusations of conspiracy, terrorism, destabilisation operations or preparing coups against the Union or its Member States. GPCI has been indirectly funded by the Wagner Group.	16.12.2024

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Therefore, GPCI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	
3.	African Initiative	Place of Registration: Moscow, Russia Date of registration: September 2023	African Initiative is a news agency that operates on the African continent. It has been involved in spreading Russian propaganda and disinformation against the West, and has hired journalists and influencers for the purpose of spreading Russian propaganda. It has also organised press tours for African journalists in the illegally occupied territories of Ukraine, during which pro-Russian narratives about the war were spread. African Initiative has also organised events serving the interests of the Government of the Russian Federation, including by facilitating access to mineral resources. Therefore, African Initiative is responsible for or supporting actions and policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability and security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	16.12.2024
▼M3 4.	AFA Media aka RED AFA Medya Anonim Şirketi aka RED AFA Медиа	Address: Kavacık Mahallesi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Caddesi, Tonoglu Block No.: 3, Beykoz, Istanbul, Türkiye Type of entity: media company Place of registration: Istanbul Date of registration: 22.11.2022 VAT Nr.: 0081804196 Registration number 423277-5 Principle place of business: Türkiye Website: https://thered.stream/imprint/ Founder: Hüseyin Dogru	AFA Medya A.Ş. is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ş. operates “RED”, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and which shares deep structural ties including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations. RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas.	20.5.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			During the violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, Red personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through RED's online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform. AFA Medya Anonim Şirketi thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation that undermine stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in information manipulation.	
5.	Voice of Europe (Russian: Голос Европы)	Address: Krakovská 583/9, 110 00 Prague, Czech Republic Website: www.voiceofeurope.com, www.voiceofeurope.eu Type of entity: Limited Liability Company (s.r.o.) Place of registration: Prague Date of registration: 14.3.2023 Registration number: CZ05185327 Principal place of business: Czech Republic	Voice of Europe is an online media outlet, engaged in a systematic international campaign of media manipulation and distortion of facts through its website and accounts on Facebook, YouTube, Telegram and X. Voice of Europe disseminated concerted disinformation related to Ukraine, the Union and its Member States with the aim of supporting the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation. It systematically undermined the public image of Ukraine and its efforts to defend itself against Russia's war of aggression, and the credibility of the assistance of the Union and its Member States to Ukraine's defence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections. Through its activities, Voice of Europe is implementing and supporting actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States, through engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including the 2024 European Parliament elections, and through engaging in the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. Voice of Europe was secretly financed and directed by Viktor Medvedchuk, a pro-Russian Ukrainian politician and businessperson with close ties to the leadership of the Russian Federation, through his associate Artem Marchevskyi. Voice of Europe was used to funnel financial resources designated for the remuneration of propagandists and the building an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe. Therefore, Voice of Europe was involved in activities facilitating the construction of Viktor Medvedchuk's influence network in the Union and its Member States.	20.5.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
6.	Norebo JSC	Address: Office 510, 43 Schmidta Street, 183038 Murmansk, Russian Federation Type of entity: Joint Stock Company Place of registration: Murmansk Date of registration: 2.11.2007 Registration number: 1201000007889 TIN / KPP: 2901170107 / 519001001	Norebo JSC is a Russian fishing company. Vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC show particular movement patterns that are inconsistent with regular economic practices and fishing activities. The movement patterns align with malign objectives, such as repeatedly being in the vicinity of or loitering near critical infrastructure and military sites. The movement patterns have been linked, including by Member States and the authorities of third states, to the Russian state-sponsored surveillance campaign that employs inter alia, civilian fishing trawlers, to conduct espionage missions directed against civilian and military infrastructure in the North and Baltic Sea. Those activities can facilitate future sabotage operations. Shipping vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC have also been equipped with technology that may be used for espionage. A Norebo JSC vessel has been banned from entering Dutch port facilities due to espionage. Norebo JSC has also received several loans from Sberbank, a Russian state-owned bank. Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new “maritime doctrine”, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time. Norebo JSC thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure.	20.5.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
7.	Murman SeaFood (Russian: Мурман СиФуд, Мурманские морепродукты)	Address: Ulitsa Karla Marksa, 28, Murmansk, Murmansk Oblast, Russian Federation, 183025 Type of entity: limited liability company Place of registration: Murmansk	Murman SeaFood (MSF) is a Russian fishing company. Melkart-5 (Russian: Мелькарт-5), a vessel owned and operated by MSF, has repeatedly shown untypical behaviour inconsistent with its regular economic practices and fishing activities, including its presence in close vicinity to an ongoing NATO military exercise, and regular presence close to Norwegian critical infrastructure and military sites. In particular Melkart-5 showed highly unusual navigation practices in the immediate vicinity of a subsea cable in the Norwegian North Sea, crossing the cable multiple times, immediately before the cable was severely damaged. In addition, crew of Melkart-5 violated Norwegian on-shoring regulations while being caught setting off to investigate a Norwegian bridge critical for military logistic purposes in a clandestine manner. Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new "maritime doctrine", which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time. MSF thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure.	20.5.2025
8.	Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Main Radio Frequency Centre" General Radio Frequency Centre GRFC Федеральное Государственное Унитарное Предприятие "Главный Радиочастотный Центр" ФГУП "ГРЧЦ"	Address: 7, Derbenevskaya nab. 7 p., Moscow 115114. 15 115114, город Москва, Дербеневская наб, д. 7 стр. 15 Type of entity: Federal agency Place of registration: Moscow, Russian Federation Date of registration: 30.3.2001 BIN: 1027739334479 INN: 7706228218 KPP: 772501001 Principal place of business: Russia	The General Radio Frequency Centre (GRFC) is responsible for ensuring the proper use of radio frequencies and devices for civil purposes, and monitors compliance with legislation. It is one of the main organisations which contribute to decisions about the use and supervision of the radio frequency sector. Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.	20.5.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			The electronic warfare centre in Kaliningrad has received new jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas. Therefore, GRFC is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure and through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.	
9.	Stark Industries Solutions Ltd.	Date of registration: 10.2.2022 Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom (maildrop address) Registration number: 13906017 Website: https://stark-industries.solutions/ Website: https://pq.hosting/	Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is owned and operated by the Moldavian nationals Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti, through the web hosting service PQ Hosting. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world. Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide those activities from European law enforcement and security agencies. Therefore, Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest. Stark is associated with Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti.	20.5.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
▼M6				
10.	Federal State-owned Enterprise ‘Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network’ (RTRS); Федеральное государственное унитарное предприятие ‘Российская телевизионная и радиовещательная сеть’	Address: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, Russia Website: https://moscow.rtrs.ru/ Place of registration: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, Russia Date of registration: 30.11.2001 Registration number: ИНН: 7717127211; ОГРН: 1027739456084	The Federal State-owned Enterprise ‘Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network’ (RTRS) operates Russia’s terrestrial broadcasting infrastructure. It is directly subordinated to the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation and operates under the authority of a general director appointed by the Russian President. RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called ‘All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels’ such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24. RTRS plays a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there. Therefore, RTRS is implementing and benefiting from policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.	15.7.2025
11.	841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center of the Baltic Fleet 841-й центр радиоэлектронной борьбы	Address: 238580, Kaliningrad oblast, Yantarny settlement, Balebin street, 09643 238580, Калининградская обл., пгт.Янтарный, ул.Балебина, в/ч 09643 Type of entity: Military unit Place of registration: Kalininingrad region, Russian Federation Phone number: 8(40153)37-244 Military unit 09643	The 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center is at the core of one of the strongest electronic warfare groups in Russia. The centre is responsible for using technology to disorganise any system of shortwave communication, conducting electronic warfare exercises (EW) to disrupt enemy navigation and radio communications as well as for the collection and analysis of intelligence information obtained by observing electromagnetic radiation in the short and ultrashort wave ranges. Several European countries have experienced GPS signal failures, which have been attributed to electronic warfare activities by Russia, specifically from Kaliningrad. This includes deliberate jamming and ‘spoofing’ of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. Interference and manipulation of GPS signals has led to obstacles for landing civil planes.	15.7.2025

▼M6

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			The 841st Separate EW Center in Kaliningrad has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas. Therefore, 841st Separate EW Center, as part of Russia's military forces enabling the misuse of radio frequency sector, is responsible for engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.	
12.	BRICS Journalist Association	Website: bricspress.live	The BRICS Journalists Association (BJA) is a Russian NGO linked to the Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI), created by Yevgeny Prigozhin, and headed by Oksana Vovk (Mira Terada). The BJA has been used as a vehicle to disseminate pro-Russian narratives and disinformation under the guise of independent journalism, including fake content originating from the Storm-1516 Information Manipulation Set (IMS). Therefore, the BJA is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	15.7.2025
13.	Center for Geopolitical Expertise Центр геополитических экспертиз, CGE	Website: cge.evrazia.ru, cge.su Place of registration: Ul. Dinamovskaya D.1a, Office 409, Moscow, RUS, 109044 Date of registration: 17.12.2002 Registration number: 1027739806940	The Center for Geopolitical Expertise (CGE) is a Moscow-based think tank founded by Aleksandr Dugin, and headed by Valery Korovin, accused of orchestrating disinformation campaigns aimed at targeting Ukrainian interests, discrediting Western political figures, and influencing electoral processes in Western countries. CGE and its director, Valery Mikhaylovich Korovin, are reportedly involved in creating and disseminating false information by utilising artificial intelligence tools to produce deepfake videos, and supporting a network of hundreds of fake news websites. CGE is alleged to have worked closely with Russia's military intelligence agency (GRU), receiving financial support to carry out these operations.	15.7.2025

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Therefore, the CGE is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	
14.	Foundation to Battle Injustice	Date of creation: 23.3.2021 Website: fondfbr.ru	The Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI) is a fake human-rights defence NGO created in March 2021 by Wagner group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. The R-FBI has been involved in numerous information operations targeting France and Ukraine, including a campaign accusing French soldiers of having kidnapped children from Niger just after the military coup d'état in 2023. Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023, the R-FBI has been involved in the amplification of numerous Storm-1516's information operations. Therefore, the R-FBI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	15.7.2025
15.	Tigerweb	Website: Tigerweb.ru Place of registration: 295000, Krim Republic, Simferopol City, Oktyabirskaya Street, 3, Office 408 Date of registration: 2019 Registration number: 1199112018973	Tigerweb is the Russian Crimea-based web-company that operates the informational manipulation project 'Portal Kombat', which disseminates pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, through various so-called 'informational portals'. Therefore, Tigerweb is involved in the implementation of actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	15.7.2025

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▼**M2**

ANNEX II

List of tangible assets referred to in Article 2a

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▼**M2**

ANNEX III

List of legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 2b

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▼**M2**

ANNEX IV

List of legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 2c

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